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ABSTRACT 
The co-occurrence of positive and negative attributes of an attitude object typically accounts for 
less than a quarter of the variance in felt ambivalence toward these objects, rendering this 
evaluative incongruence insufficient for explaining felt ambivalence.  The present research tested 
whether another type of incongruence, semantic incongruence, also causes felt ambivalence.  
Semantic incongruence arises from inconsistencies in the descriptive content of attitude objects' 
attributes (e.g., attributes that are not mutually supportive), independent of these attributes' 
valences.  Experiment 1 manipulated evaluative and semantic incongruence using valence-norms 
and semantic-norms.  Both of these norm-based manipulations independently predicted felt 
ambivalence, and, in Experiment 2, they even did so over and above self-based incongruence (i.e., 
participants' idiosyncratic perceptions of evaluative and semantic incongruence).  Experiments 3a 
and 3b revealed that aversive dissonant feelings play a role in the effects of evaluative 
incongruence, but not semantic incongruence, on felt ambivalence. 
 
KEYWORDS:  Attitudes, Ambivalence, Evaluative Incongruence, Semantic Incongruence. 
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Feeling Torn When Everything Seems Right:  
Semantic Incongruence Causes Felt Ambivalence 
 Have you ever met a person who seemed perfect, and nonetheless caused mixed, conflicted, 
or ambivalent feelings in you, as though the person was too perfect?  Imagine a person whose core 
attributes – intelligence and humility – remind you of your two idols: Albert Einstein and Mahatma 
Gandhi. It would seem impossible that you feel ambivalent towards this Einstein-Gandhi hybrid, 
whose attributes are uniformly positive.  In opposition to this intuition, however, we propose that 
feelings of ambivalence can arise.  Specifically, we consider the possibility that felt ambivalence 
may arise due to semantic incongruence, which stems from inconsistencies between attitude 
objects' attributes, such as intelligence – an agentic trait – and humility – a communal trait.  Four 
experiments examined the effect of semantic incongruence on felt ambivalence, and tested whether 
this effect is independent of the effect of evaluative incongruence on felt ambivalence. 
Evaluative Incongruence and Felt Ambivalence 
 Felt ambivalence is regarded as a particularly important aspect of attitudes (Priester & 
Petty, 2001), because felt ambivalence comes with far reaching implications.  For example, felt 
ambivalence can increase attitude-behavior consistency (Jonas, Diehl, & Brömer, 1997), elicit 
easier attitude change (Tourangeau, Rasinski, Bradburn, & D'Andrade, 1989), and heighten 
vulnerability to self-threat (Haddock & Gebauer, 2011).  Felt ambivalence can also decrease 
elaboration of anti-attitudinal information (Clark, Wegener, & Fabrigar, 2008) and reduce 
resistance to persuasion (Visser & Mirabile, 2004).  In addition to these important implications of 
felt ambivalence, most people are said to feel ambivalent about most attitude objects most of the 
time (Zaller & Feldman, 1992).  Hence, it is not surprising that a large and persistent body of 
research has tried to understand the causes of felt ambivalence (Newby-Clark, McGregor, & 
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Zanna, 2002; Priester & Petty, 1996, 2001; Priester, Petty, & Park, 2007; Thomson, Zanna, & 
Griffin, 1995). 
 Originally, the causes of felt ambivalence have been sought in a single predictor: evaluative 
incongruence, defined as valence inconsistencies between attitude objects' attributes (Eagly & 
Chaiken, 1993; Olson & Zanna, 1993; Wegener, Downing, Krosnick, & Petty, 1995).  The 
measurement of evaluative incongruence clarifies its nature.  Specifically, participants are typically 
instructed to report how positively they judge the positive attributes of an attitude object, 
irrespective of the attitude object's negative attributes.  Participants are also instructed to report 
how negatively they judge the negative attributes of this attitude object, irrespective of the attitude 
object's positive attributes (Kaplan, 1972).  Different mathematical models have been proposed to 
integrate these two responses (Breckler, 2004; Priester & Petty, 1996; Thomson et al., 1995).  
However, none of the models yield more than a moderate relation between evaluative 
incongruence and felt ambivalence.  For example, Thompson et al. (1995) found relations up to 
only r = .40.  Priester and Petty (1996) repeatedly found relations no higher than r = .52.  In line 
with these findings, Riketta (2004) found an omnibus effect size of r = .44 in a meta-analysis 
including 27 independent studies. 
 How can there only be a 19% overlap (based on Riketta’s r) between evaluative 
incongruence and felt ambivalence?  Attitude researchers have long puzzled over this question.  
Newby-Clark et al. (2002) provided a theoretical and empirical attempt towards closing this gap 
between evaluative incongruence and felt ambivalence.  These researchers showed that evaluative 
incongruence was a stronger predictor of felt ambivalence when the evaluatively incongruent 
attributes were rendered more accessible in consciousness.  Further, this effect was pronounced 
among people high in preference for consistency (Cialdini, Trost, & Newsome, 1995).   
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Priester and Petty (2001) took a different approach towards the same issue.  Specifically, 
these researchers pointed out that past research had exclusively focused on evaluative 
incongruence within a given person in order to explain felt ambivalence.  At the same time, they 
argued that felt ambivalence may also arise from evaluative conflict between a given person and 
other persons.  According to this account, people can feel ambivalent towards an attitude object if 
they possess uniformly positive evaluations towards this attitude object, but a close other possesses 
negative evaluations towards the same attitude object. 
 Of importance, all of these approaches treated some form of evaluative incongruence as the 
sole cause of felt ambivalence.  For example, Newby-Clark et al. (2002) focused on evaluative 
incongruence between consciously accessible attributes within an individual.  Priester and Petty 
(2001) focused on evaluative incongruence between individuals, thereby relaxing the classic 
definition of ambivalence as an intra-psychic conflict (Kaplan, 1972).  The present research takes 
a complementary approach, seeking additional origins of felt ambivalence in non-evaluative 
incongruence.  Specifically, we examine whether semantic incongruence can increase felt 
ambivalence even after evaluative incongruence is taken into account.  To be clear, we do not 
propose that semantic incongruence accounts for felt ambivalence any better than the previously 
revealed factors (e.g., accessibility, desire for evaluative consistency, interpersonal conflict).  
Instead, we suggest that semantic incongruence is a fundamentally different dimension, 
constituting an additional cause of felt ambivalence. 
Semantic Incongruence and Felt Ambivalence 
 Evaluative incongruence is not the only type of incongruence that can exist between 
attitude objects' attributes.  Research on person perception has long pointed towards a second type 
of incongruence, labeled descriptive or semantic incongruence (Peabody, 1970).  Translated into 
the language of attitude research, semantic incongruence can be defined as content inconsistency 
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between attitude objects' attributes, independent of these attributes' valence.  In research on person 
perception, semantic incongruence is usually studied within the framework of Wiggins's 
interpersonal circumplex model (Abele & Wojciszke, 2007; Paulhus & John, 1998; Wiggins, 1979; 
Wiggins, Trapnell, & Phillips, 1988).  The interpersonal circumplex is spanned by two orthogonal 
dimensions (Figure 1): agency (e.g., dominant, persistent, assertive) and communion (e.g., soft-
hearted, charitable, kind).  Wiggins's model can parsimoniously organize psychological attributes 
describing cultures (Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002), groups (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & 
Xu, 2002), other persons (Abele & Wojciszke, 2007), and self (i.e., personality traits; Gebauer, 
Paulhus, & Neberich, 2013).   
How does the model help to separate semantic incongruence from evaluative 
incongruence?  The opening paragraph provides an illustrative example.  Suppose that a person is 
high in both intelligence and humility. Intelligence is an agentic trait, while humility is a 
communal trait.  To some extent, the possession of both attributes is incongruent in terms of their 
semantic content, as shown through their roughly 90° angle separation (i.e., orthogonality) in the 
circumplex model. In contrast, there is little content incongruence in a description of someone who 
is simultaneously high in intelligence and high in creativity (both agency traits with roughly 5° 
separation) or simultaneously high in humility and helpfulness (both communal traits with roughly 
5° separation).  Note that, in each of these cases, all of the traits are evaluated very favorably 
(Abele, Uchronski, Suitner, & Wojciszke, 2008; Anderson, 1968) and thus evaluative 
incongruence is very low (or absent).  That is, it is the meaning of the traits per se and not their 
evaluative tone that is incongruent.   
The main aim of the present research was to test whether semantic incongruence causes felt 
ambivalence independently of evaluative incongruence.  Researchers have speculated that 
semantic incongruence might be even more prevalent as a source of felt ambivalence than is 
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evaluative incongruence (Epstein, 1980; see also Thompson & Zanna, 1995).  Yet, to the best of 
our knowledge, attitude research has never empirically tested whether semantic incongruence even 
contributes to felt ambivalence.  We therefore sought to close this empirical gap.  As such, the 
present research may also help to bridge research on person perception and attitudes.  The former 
has distinguished between semantic and evaluative incongruence, whereas the latter has studied the 
causes of felt ambivalence.  This integration may make an important step toward solving the 
longstanding puzzle about the elusive causes of felt ambivalence. 
 A second aim of the present research was to distinguish between two forms of evaluative 
incongruence as well as two forms of semantic incongruence.  Specifically, past research has 
derived indicators of evaluative incongruence by either one of two means.  One method capitalized 
on valence norms of attitude objects' attributes (e.g., Priester & Petty, 1996–Studies 2 and 3).  The 
other method capitalized on participants’ idiosyncratic self-reports of attributes' valences (e.g., 
Priester & Petty, 1996–Study 1).  It is not yet clear whether both of these procedures are strictly 
interchangeable.  An obvious psychological assumption is that norm-based incongruence is merely 
a (somewhat cruder) proxy for the latter self-based incongruence, which actually resides in the 
individual’s thinking.  If so, norm-based incongruence effects on felt ambivalence should vanish 
when self-based incongruence is additionally considered.  In statistical terms – self-based 
incongruence should fully mediate the effect of norm-based incongruence on felt ambivalence. 
  However, there is also an important conceptual difference between norm-based and self-
based incongruence.  Specifically, norm-based incongruence largely reflects consensually held, 
culture-based incongruence, whereas self-based incongruence largely reflects consciously held, 
idiosyncrasy-based incongruence (cf. Olson & Fazio, 2004).  Given this conceptual difference, 
there are at least two reasons that norm-based incongruence may predict felt ambivalence over and 
above self-based incongruence.  First, norm-based incongruence includes extrapersonal 
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representations, which can exert effects independently of intrapersonal representations (Gebauer, 
Nehrlich, Sedikides, & Neberich, in press). Second, norm-based incongruence may shape implicit 
associations in memory, which can exert effects independently of conscious, self-reported 
associations (Gebauer, Göritz, Hofmann, & Sedikides, 2012).  Both of these factors are likely to be 
important in the context of predicting felt ambivalence because, as noted earlier, the attitudes of 
others are important for predicting personal feelings of ambivalence (Priester & Petty, 2001), and 
the likelihood of simultaneous co-activation of opposing attributes is an important predictor of felt 
ambivalence (Newby-Clark et al., 1998).  These possible roles become even more tangible in the 
light of the paradigm we use in the present research, which focuses on personal attributes.  Our 
mental representations of personal attributes show a deep level of mental organization.  There is 
evidence for implicit memory effects involving the Big Five personality traits (Edwards & Collins, 
2008) and social values (Pakizeh, Gebauer, & Maio, 2007), and the interpersonal circumplex can 
organize traits (Digman, 1997) and values (Trapnell & Paulhus, 2012). Agentic and communal 
traits can be distinguished even at very early stages of information processing – stages that hardly 
reach consciousness (Abele & Bruckmüller, 2011). Finally, the implicit semantics of traits can 
predict behavior over and above the corresponding explicit semantics of these traits (Perkins & 
Forehand, 2006; Schnabel, Asendorpf, & Greenwald, 2008). Overall, then, felt ambivalence may 
well be independently caused by (a) norm-based evaluative incongruence, (b) self-based evaluative 
incongruence, (c) norm-based semantic incongruence, and (d) self-based semantic incongruence, 
albeit much – but not all – of the norm-based incongruence effects should be mediated by self-
based incongruence effects.  Figure 2 displays the resultant model. 
 The final aim of the present research was to examine the role of dissonant feelings 
(Festinger, 1957) in evaluative and semantic incongruence effects on felt ambivalence.  Dissonant 
feelings are affect-laden and aversive in nature, and they have been repeatedly linked to evaluative 
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conflict between beliefs about personal actions (and their consequences) and personal attitudes 
(see Elliot & Devine, 1994).  Consequently, we expected dissonant feelings to arise from 
evaluative incongruence.  However, we are not aware of any research revealing a link between 
semantic incongruence and dissonant feelings.  Although Festinger’s (1957) cognitive dissonance 
theory was consistent with this possibility, subsequent research has repeatedly revealed the affect-
laden and aversive nature of dissonant feelings (e.g., Cooper, Zanna, & Taves, 1978; Elliot & 
Devine, 1994; Zanna, Higgins, & Taves, 1978).  This is theoretically different from the state 
elicited by semantic incongruence.  As described in the aforementioned literature on person 
perception, semantic incongruence is theoretically more akin to a cognitive state of puzzlement 
from the lack of fit between different mental contents.  For instance, a person who is highly 
intelligent yet humble might elicit a sense that “something is not quite right,” but might not elicit 
an aversive arousal because, after all, the evaluative implications of both traits are quite favorable.  
Semantic incongruence does not entail a tension between different feelings, whereas evaluative 
incongruence inherently does.  Felt ambivalence may arise from both the cognitive disquiet 
inherent in semantic incongruence and from the emotional tension inherent in evaluative 
incongruence, with feelings of dissonance mediating the effects of the latter. 
 These hypotheses were tested across four experiments. These experiments progressed from 
examining the independent effects of norm-based semantic incongruence and norm-based 
evaluative incongruence on felt ambivalence (Experiment 1) to examining the additional role of 
norm-based and self-based semantic and evaluative incongruence (Experiment 2) and examining 
the role of feelings of dissonance (Experiments 3a and 3b).  
EXPERIMENT 1 
 We designed this experiment to resemble Priester and Petty's (1996) seminal experiments 
on the effect of evaluative incongruence on felt ambivalence.  First, we aimed to replicate the 
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effect of evaluative incongruence on felt ambivalence.  Second, and more important, we aimed to 
show that semantic incongruence explains felt ambivalence independently of the effect of 
evaluative incongruence.  We deem this a conservative test of the semantic incongruence 
hypothesis, because the present design was adapted from Priester and Petty (1996), who originally 
devised it to examine the effect of evaluative incongruence on felt ambivalence. 
Method 
Participants 
 32 Cardiff University undergraduate psychology students participated for course credit. 
Most participants were female (94%) and British (97%).  Participants' mean age was 19.41 years 
(SD = 2.54). 
Procedure and Measures 
 The experiment took place in large group sessions in the laboratory.  Each participant 
completed the study individually on a computer.  Following Priester and Petty (1996), we 
examined felt ambivalence towards different target persons, who varied in their personality traits.  
Thus, the target persons constituted the attitude objects and their personality traits constituted their 
(more or less incongruent) attributes.  Also in line with Priester and Petty (1996), participants were 
instructed to rate their felt ambivalence towards each of 20 target persons, and for each target 
person, participants saw the target person's two "most descriptive and prevalent personality 
characteristics."  These personality traits were randomly selected and paired from Wiggins's 
interpersonal circumplex (Wiggins et al., 1988; Figure 1; see Table 1's second and third column).  
Because the interpersonal circumplex has been found to accompany an exhaustive list of 
personality traits (McCrae & Costa, 1989; Wiggins, Phillips, & Trapnell, 1989), random selection 
and pairing of traits helps to guarantee that our findings are generally applicable, rather than valid 
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only for a small and specific subset of traits.  Demographic items preceded the rating of target 
persons, and the study concluded with a debriefing.   
 Norm-based manipulation of evaluative incongruence.  As described above, we 
randomly selected 40 personality traits (i.e., attitude objects' attributes) and randomly paired them, 
yielding 20 target persons (i.e., attitude objects).  Because the selected personality traits naturally 
vary in their valence (Abele et al., 2008; Anderson, 1968), it follows that the degree of evaluative 
incongruence also varies naturally between each resultant pair of attributes.  This variation leads to 
a natural manipulation of evaluative incongruence between target persons.  We followed Priester 
and Petty's (1996) strategy to use valence-norms for each personality trait to derive an objective 
evaluative incongruence score for each target person.  We obtained these valence norms via a 
pretest on N = 55 Cardiff University psychology undergraduate students (age: M = 20.87, SD = 
2.89; sex: 91% female; 100% British).  Each pretest participant was instructed to indicate for each 
of the 40 personality traits "how positive or negative you perceive it when other people possess 
this trait." The rating scales ranged from -3 (I perceive it as very NEGATIVE when other people 
possess this trait) to +3 (I perceive it as very POSITIVE when other people possess this trait).
1
  We 
calculated evaluative incongruence scores using the intercomponent ambivalence model (Maio, 
Esses, & Bell, 2000).
2
 
 Norm-based manipulation of semantic incongruence. Random selection and pairing of 
personality traits yielded not only a natural manipulation of evaluative incongruence between 
target persons, it also yielded a natural manipulation of semantic incongruence between target 
persons.  Wiggins' (1979; Wiggins et al., 1988) interpersonal circumplex of traits provides the 
angle of each trait on the circumplex.  The discrepancies between the traits' angles served as 
semantic incongruence scores for each target person (see Table 1's fifth column) (cf. Pakizeh et al., 
2008). 
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 Felt ambivalence.  The measure of felt ambivalence was closely modeled after Priester and 
Petty's (1996) measure (for similar approaches see Priester & Petty, 2001; Thompson et al., 1995).  
Specifically, for each target person participants completed the following three items: "I feel 
ambivalent towards this person," "I have mixed thoughts and feelings towards this person," and 
"My thoughts and feelings towards this person are conflicted."  The first item was accompanied by 
Kaplan's (1972) definition of felt ambivalence (i.e., "ambivalence refers to the co-existence of both 
positive and negative emotions or attitudes [love and hatred] towards a person or thing at the same 
time").  Internal consistency of this three-item measure was high (α = .86). 
Results and Discussion 
Analytic Strategy 
 As in Priester and Petty (1996), target persons were nested in participants.  Hence, we 
examined our hypotheses using multi-level models with the software HLM 6.06 (Raudenbush, 
Bryk, & Congdon, 2004).  All variables were situated at level 1 (target person level) and thus we 
centered all predictor variables around the grand mean (Raudenbush, 1989). HLM provides 
unstandardized effects (b).  In order to obtain standardized effects (β), we z-standardized all level 1 
variables (i.e., all grand means = 0 and all SDs = 1) prior to calculating the multi-level models.  
This allowed us to interpret bs as βs. 
Replication of Evaluative Incongruence Effects on Felt Ambivalence 
 Conceptually replicating the classic effect of evaluative incongruence on felt ambivalence, 
Table 2's first data column shows an effect of norm-based evaluative incongruence on felt 
ambivalence.  This effect was similar in size to previous effects of evaluative incongruence on felt 
ambivalence (Priester & Petty, 1996; Riketta, 2004; Thompson et al., 1995).  Thus, the present 
study's design was well-suited to replicating prior effects of evaluative incongruence and, hence, 
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for using these effects as a baseline against which to compare the effects of semantic 
incongruence.  
Dependence between Evaluative Incongruence and Semantic Incongruence 
 The design also allowed us to examine the dependence between evaluative incongruence 
and semantic incongruence.  Knowledge of this dependence is important for our further analyses.  
Specifically, if the two types of incongruence are dependent, it becomes necessary to control for 
one type of incongruence in the analyses of the other type in order to know which type of 
incongruence actually causes a given effect. 
 Past theory and research strongly suggests that evaluative and semantic incongruence are 
partly dependent.  This should be the case because evaluative and semantic content of traits are 
related (Gebauer, Haddock, Broemer, & von Hecker, 2012; Gebauer, Wagner, Sedikides, & 
Nebrerich, in press).  The conflicting evaluations implied by traits at opposite ends of the same 
semantic continuum are likely to also be evaluatively conflicting.  Also, human thought and 
behavior is fundamentally driven by the desire to maximize self-profitability, and other persons 
who possess communal traits serve better to maximize self-profitability than other persons who 
possess agentic traits (Abele & Wojciszke, 2007).  Thus, communal traits are more positively 
evaluated in others than are agentic traits (Gebauer, Leary, & Neberich, 2012; Wojciszke, Baryla, 
Parzuchowski, Szymkow, & Abele, 2011). 
 To examine the dependence between norm-based evaluative incongruence and norm-based 
semantic incongruence, we correlated Table 1's evaluative and semantic incongruence indices 
across the 20 target persons.  As expected, there was a significant correlation between evaluative 
and semantic incongruence, r(20) = .53, p = .02.  Thus, it is important to control for the effects of 
semantic incongruence when examining the effects of evaluative incongruence and to control for 
the effects of evaluative incongruence when examining the effects of semantic incongruence. 
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Semantic Incongruence Effects on Felt Ambivalence 
 Table 2's second data column shows the effect of norm-based semantic incongruence on 
felt ambivalence.  Compared to our effect of norm-based evaluative incongruence (see also 
Priester & Petty, 1996; Riketta, 2004; Thompson et al., 1995), results indicated a stronger effect of 
norm-based semantic incongruence on felt ambivalence and this finding is in line with prior 
speculation (Epstein, 1980; see also Thompson & Zanna, 1995). 
 Table 2's third data column shows the effect of norm-based semantic incongruence on felt 
ambivalence, while controlling for norm-based evaluative incongruence.  Results indicated a 
significant independent effect of norm-based semantic incongruence on felt ambivalence.  In fact, 
the effect of norm-based semantic incongruence on felt ambivalence was very similar in size to 
prior effects of evaluative incongruence on felt ambivalence (Priester & Petty, 1996; Riketta, 2004; 
Thompson et al., 1995).   
Table 2's fourth data column shows the effect of norm-based evaluative incongruence on 
felt ambivalence, while controlling for norm-based semantic incongruence.  Controlling for norm-
based semantic incongruence reduced the effect of norm-based evaluative incongruence on felt 
ambivalence, and this reduction was significant, z = 7.92, SE = .03, p = .001. Nevertheless, the 
effect of evaluative incongruence remained significant (see Table 2).  Thus, adapting a classic 
design (Priester & Petty, 1996), the present research is the first to disentangle evaluative and 
semantic incongruence, showing that both types of incongruence have substantial effects on felt 
ambivalence. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
 The design employed in the present research (see also Priester & Petty, 1996) can afford a 
small number of participants per experiment, because target persons constitute the level of 
analyses and each participant rates 20 target persons, yielding N × 20 lines of data.  However, 
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small numbers of participants come with the risk that results can be highly influenced by the 
responses of a few atypical participants.  For this reason, it is particularly important to demonstrate 
replicability of these results across several experiments.  Such replications demonstrate the 
robustness of the uncovered effects even more strongly than a single experiment with a large 
number of participants (Fiedler & Kareev, 2006).  Thus, the first aim of Experiment 2 was to 
replicate Experiment 1.  The second aim of Experiment 2 was to examine the role of self-based 
semantic and evaluative incongruence in Experiment 1's effects.  This enabled us to test whether 
norm-based and self-based semantic and evaluative incongruence each have independent effects on 
feelings of ambivalence.   
Method 
Participants 
 33 Cardiff University undergraduate psychology students participated for course credit. 
Most participants were female (91%) and British (94%).  Participants' mean age was 19.97 years 
(SD = 3.58). 
Procedure and Measures 
 This experiment took place in large group sessions in the laboratory.  The experiment was 
identical to Experiment 1, with two additions.  Specifically, after rating the 20 target persons, 
participants completed self-based measures of evaluative and semantic incongruence (at random).  
The norm-based manipulations of evaluative and semantic incongruence as well as the measure of 
felt ambivalence (α = .89) were described in Experiment 1.  Hence, below we will only describe 
the self-based measures of evaluative and semantic incongruence. 
 Self-based measure of evaluative incongruence.  Each participant completed the same 
measure as did pretest participants in Experiment 1 (see description of norm-based manipulation of 
evaluative incongruence in Experiment 1's method section).  For each participant, we calculated an 
Page 15 of 46
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/pspb
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
Sources of Felt Ambivalence   16 
idiosyncratic evaluative incongruence score, using the same mathematical model used in 
Experiment 1 to calculate norm-based evaluative incongruence (Maio et al., 2000). 
 Self-based measure of semantic incongruence.  Each participant read the following 
instructions: "On this page you will find the same pairs of traits you have seen before. We differ in 
our perception of (a) how well certain traits fit together, (b) conflict with each other, and (c) are 
unrelated to each other (neither fit nor conflict). Using the scale beneath each trait pair, please 
indicate whether you generally perceive the two traits of each pair as fitting together, conflicting, 
or being unrelated to each other."  The 20 pairs of traits followed, and for each pair participants 
read "I generally perceive the following two traits: [trait x] and [trait y]..." followed by a 9-point 
rating scale ranging from -4 "...as strongly CONFLICTING each other," via 0 "...as UNRELATED 
to each other," to +4 "...as strongly FITTING each other." 
Results and Discussion 
Validity Check 
 This experiment affords verification of the norm-based manipulations of evaluative and 
semantic incongruence as well as the self-based measures of evaluative and semantic 
incongruence. Following Cronbach and Meehl (1955), we should obtain support for a particular 
nomological net.  Specifically, norm-based evaluative incongruence should be primarily related to 
self-based evaluative incongruence, but not to self-based semantic incongruence.  In addition, 
norm-based semantic incongruence should be primarily related to self-based semantic 
incongruence, but not to self-based evaluative incongruence. 
 To test for these relations, we conducted two analyses.  First, we simultaneously predicted 
self-based evaluative incongruence with norm-based evaluative incongruence and norm-based 
semantic incongruence, while controlling for self-based semantic incongruence.  In line with 
predictions, Table 3's first data column shows that norm-based evaluative incongruence strongly 
Page 16 of 46
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/pspb
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
Sources of Felt Ambivalence   17 
predicted self-based evaluative incongruence, whereas Table 3's second data column shows that 
norm-based semantic incongruence did not predict self-based evaluative incongruence.  Second, 
we simultaneously predicted self-based semantic incongruence with norm-based evaluative 
incongruence and norm-based semantic incongruence, while controlling for self-based evaluative 
incongruence.  In line with predictions, Table 3's third data column shows that norm-based 
evaluative incongruence very weakly, and negatively, predicted self-based semantic incongruence, 
whereas Table 3's fourth data column shows that norm-based semantic incongruence strongly 
predicted self-based semantic incongruence.  Thus, the suitability of our manipulations and self-
report measures was supported. 
Replication of Experiment 1 
 Table 2's first data column shows that norm-based evaluative incongruence predicted felt 
ambivalence.  Table 2's second data column shows that norm-based semantic incongruence 
predicted felt ambivalence even more strongly. Table 2's third data column shows that norm-based 
semantic incongruence predicted felt ambivalence, even when norm-based evaluative 
incongruence was controlled.  Table 2's fourth data column shows that norm-based evaluative 
incongruence remained a predictor of felt ambivalence, even when norm-based semantic 
incongruence was controlled.  However, as in Experiment 1, controlling for norm-based semantic 
incongruence significantly reduced the effect of norm-based evaluative incongruence on felt 
ambivalence, z = 7.76, SE = .03, p < .001.  Thus, the results of Experiment 1 were fully replicated.  
Norm-based evaluative and semantic incongruence independently elicited felt ambivalence. 
Norm-Based Evaluative Incongruence, Self-Based Evaluative Incongruence, and Felt 
Ambivalence 
We tested whether norm-based evaluative incongruence remained a significant predictor of 
felt ambivalence, despite controlling for self-based evaluative incongruence.  Table 4's first data 
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column shows the results of this analysis.  Specifically, the effect of norm-based evaluative 
incongruence on felt ambivalence remained significant, even when controlling for self-based 
evaluative incongruence. These results notwithstanding, a Sobel test (Sobel, 1982) revealed that 
controlling for self-based evaluative incongruence significantly reduced the effect of norm-based 
evaluative incongruence on felt ambivalence (Table 4's second data column), and self-based 
evaluative incongruence emerged as a comparatively stronger predictor of felt-ambivalence (Table 
4's third data column).  Overall then, self-based evaluative incongruence did play an important role 
in felt ambivalence effects, but norm-based evaluative incongruence partly caused felt 
ambivalence independent of self-based evaluative incongruence.  (Following Experiment 1's 
results, we controlled for norm-based and self-based semantic incongruence throughout all 
analyses described in this paragraph.)  Next, we tested for analogous effects regarding semantic 
incongruence. 
Norm-Based Semantic Incongruence, Self-Based Semantic Incongruence, and Felt 
Ambivalence 
 We tested whether norm-based semantic incongruence remained a significant predictor of 
felt ambivalence, despite controlling for self-based semantic incongruence.  As shown in Table 5's 
first data column, the effect of norm-based semantic incongruence on felt ambivalence remained 
significant, even when controlling for self-based semantic incongruence. These results 
notwithstanding, a Sobel test revealed that controlling for self-based semantic incongruence 
significantly reduced the effect of norm-based semantic incongruence on felt ambivalence (Table 
5's second data column), and self-based semantic incongruence emerged as a comparatively 
stronger predictor of felt-ambivalence (Table 5's third data column).  Overall then, self-based 
semantic incongruence did play an important role in felt ambivalence effects, but norm-based 
semantic incongruence also influenced felt ambivalence independent of self-based semantic 
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incongruence.  (Following Experiment 1 results we controlled for norm-based and self-based 
evaluative incongruence throughout all analyses described in this paragraph.) 
EXPERIMENTS 3A AND 3B 
 Experiments 3a and 3b were identical and each study examined the role of dissonant 
feelings.  As detailed in the introduction, we expected dissonant feelings to play a unique role in 
evaluative incongruence effects, but not in semantic incongruence effects.  Semantic 
incongruence's independence of dissonant feelings would buttress the view that the effects of 
semantic incongruence are distinct from those of evaluative incongruence.  
Method 
Participants 
 Experiment 3a.  28 Cardiff University undergraduate psychology students participated for 
course credit. Most participants were female (93%) and all were British.  Participants' mean age 
was 18.89 years (SD = 1.50). 
 Experiment 3b.  56 Cardiff University undergraduate psychology students participated for 
course credit. Most participants were female (93%) and British (98%).  Participants' mean age was 
19.07 years (SD = 1.44). 
Procedure and Measures 
 The experiments were identical to Experiment 2 with one addition.  Specifically, at the 
phase where participants were asked to rate their felt ambivalence towards each target person, 
participants were also asked to rate their dissonant feelings towards each target person.  Items to 
assess felt ambivalence and dissonant feelings were presented in a randomized order.  Below, we 
only describe the measure of dissonant feelings (because the remaining tasks were the same as in 
the prior experiments).  As in Experiments 1 and 2, the measure of felt ambivalence exhibited high 
internal consistency (Experiment 3a: α = .86; Experiment 3b: α = .87).   
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 Dissonant feelings.  The measure of dissonant feelings was closely modeled after 
Festinger's (1957) description of dissonance (for a similar approach, see Elliot & Devine, 1994).  
Specifically, for each target person participants completed the following three items: "I feel an 
unpleasant tension when imagining this person," "I experience a feeling of unease when thinking 
about this person," and "I experience an aversive feeling when thinking about this person."  
Internal consistency of this three-item measure was high (Experiment 3a: α = .89; Experiment 3b: 
α = .90). 
Results and Discussion 
Replication of Experiments 1 and 2 
 Independent effects of norm-based evaluative and semantic incongruence.  Table 2's 
first data column shows that norm-bas d evaluative incongruence predicted felt ambivalence.  
Table 2's second data column shows that norm-based semantic incongruence predicted felt 
ambivalence even more strongly.  Table 2's third data column shows that norm-based semantic 
incongruence predicted felt ambivalence, even when norm-based evaluative incongruence was 
controlled. Consistent with our past results, controlling for norm-based semantic incongruence 
significantly reduced the effect of norm-based evaluative incongruence on felt ambivalence in 
Experiment 3a, z = 7.86, SE = .03, p < .001, and in Experiment 3b, z = 9.85, SE = .02, p < .001.  
Nonetheless, Table 2's fourth data column shows that norm-based evaluative incongruence again 
remained a significant predictor of felt ambivalence, even when norm-based semantic 
incongruence was controlled. Thus, in both studies, norm-based evaluative incongruence and 
norm-based semantic incongruence independently caused felt ambivalence. 
 Validity of norm-based and self-based evaluative and semantic incongruence.  Table 
3's first data column shows that norm-based evaluative incongruence strongly predicted self-based 
evaluative incongruence, whereas Table 3's second data column shows that norm-based semantic 
Page 20 of 46
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/pspb
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
Sources of Felt Ambivalence   21 
incongruence did not predict self-based evaluative incongruence.  At the same time, Table 3's third 
data column shows that norm-based evaluative incongruence very weakly (and negatively) 
predicted self-based semantic incongruence, whereas Table 3's fourth data column shows that 
norm-based semantic incongruence strongly predict self-reported semantic incongruence.  This 
pattern replicated prior evidence supporting the suitability of our manipulations and self-report 
measures. 
 Examining the necessity of self-based evaluative and semantic incongruence.  Table 4's 
first data column shows a significant effect of norm-based evaluative incongruence on felt 
ambivalence, despite controlling for self-based evaluative incongruence. These results 
notwithstanding, controlling for self-based evaluative incongruence significantly reduced the effect 
of norm-based evaluative incongruenc  on felt ambivalence (Table 4's second data column), and 
self-based evaluative incongruence emerged as a comparatively stronger predictor of felt-
ambivalence (Table 4's third data column).  Analogously, Table 5's first data column shows a 
significant effect of norm-based semantic incongruence on felt ambivalence, despite controlling 
for self-based semantic incongruence. These results notwithstanding, controlling for self-based 
semantic incongruence significantly reduced the effect of norm-based semantic incongruence on 
felt ambivalence (Table 5's second data column), and self-based semantic incongruence emerged 
as a comparatively stronger predictor of felt-ambivalence (Table 5's third data column).  Thus, 
across two studies, Experiment 2’s results were fully replicated.  (As in Experiment 2, the analyses 
described in this paragraph controlled for norm-based and self-based semantic incongruence in all 
analyses involving evaluative incongruence, and controlled for norm-based and self-based 
evaluative incongruence in all analyses involving semantic incongruence.) 
The Role of Dissonant Feelings 
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 Do aversive dissonant feelings play a role in evaluative incongruence effects, and are 
semantic incongruence effects free from aversive dissonant feelings?  We first tested whether 
manipulated evaluative incongruence caused dissonant feelings, controlling for manipulated 
semantic incongruence.  As expected, this was the case in Experiment 3a, β = .20, SE = .04, t(554) 
= 5.39, p < .001, and in Experiment 3b, β = .20, SE = .02, t(1103) = 8.68, p < .001.  At the same 
time, we examined whether manipulated semantic incongruence caused dissonant feelings, 
controlling for manipulated evaluative incongruence.  As expected, this was neither the case in 
Experiment 3a, β = .03, SE = .03, t(554) = .93, p = .35, nor in Experiment 3b, β = .04, SE = .02, 
t(1103) = 1.59, p = .11.   
 Second, we examined the processing role of dissonant feelings using the meditational tests 
described by Baron and Kenny (1986) and Sobel (1982).  Given that semantic incongruence was 
not a significant predictor of dissonant feelings, dissonant feelings could not mediate the effect of 
semantic incongruence on felt ambivalence in these analyses.  In contrast, evaluative incongruence 
did significantly affect dissonant feelings, and this effect was similar in size to the effect of 
evaluative incongruence on felt ambivalence (see Table 2).  Thus, dissonant feelings were a 
potential mediator of the effects of evaluative incongruence on felt ambivalence (Baron & Kenny, 
1986).  In support of this hypothesis, controlling for dissonant feelings reduced the direct effect of 
manipulated evaluative incongruence on felt ambivalence in Experiment 3a, β = .15, SE = .04, 
t(553) = 3.74, p < .001, and in Experiment 3b, β = .15, SE = .02, t(1102) = 6.82, p < .001. 
Furthermore, the meditational path was significant in Experiment 3a, z = 3.47, SE = .01, p < .001, 
and Experiment 3b, z = 5.89, SE = .01, p < .001.
3
 
 The results surrounding dissonant feelings make three relevant points.  First, dissonant 
feelings played no role in the effect of manipulated semantic incongruence on felt ambivalence.  In 
fact, manipulated semantic incongruence did not reliably affect dissonant feelings.  Thus, dissonant 
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feelings do not pose a validity-threat to the semantic incongruence hypothesis.  Second, the finding 
that evaluative incongruence--but not semantic incongruence--caused dissonant feelings is 
interesting, considering that both types of incongruence predict felt ambivalence. This pattern 
suggests that there exists a clear functional difference between evaluative incongruence and 
semantic incongruence.  This pattern also suggests that there is a clear functional difference 
between felt ambivalence and dissonant feelings, and the latter conclusion is corroborated by the 
fact that there was only small to moderate overlap between dissonant feelings and felt ambivalence 
in Experiment 3a, β = .33, SE = .05, t(555) = 6.10, p < .001, and in Experiment 3b, β = .39, SE = 
.04, t(1104) = 10.73, p < .001.  Finally, although not focal to the present research, Experiments 3a 
and 3b consistently found that dissonant feelings play a (specific) processing role for evaluative 
incongruence effects on felt ambivalence. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 People feel at least somewhat ambivalent towards most attitude objects (cf. Zaller & 
Feldmen, 1992).  At the same time, such felt ambivalence exerts a variety of important effects on 
human cognition (Clark et al., 2008), emotion (Haddock & Gebauer, 2011), and behavior (Jonas et 
al., 1997).  Not surprisingly then, understanding the causes of felt ambivalence is central in attitude 
research (Priester & Petty, 1996).  Originally, attitude researchers hypothesized that felt 
ambivalence is largely—if not exclusively—caused by valence inconsistencies between attitude 
objects' attributes (i.e., evaluative incongruence; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Olson & Zanna, 1993; 
Wegener et al., 1995).  Given the intuitive appeal of this hypothesis, it may seem paradoxical that 
study after study found that evaluative incongruence only explains a modest percentage of variance 
in felt ambivalence (Priester & Petty, 1996; Thompson et al., 1995). Echoing this, a meta-analysis 
across 27 samples estimated that evaluative incongruence only explains 19% of the variance in felt 
ambivalence (Riketta, 2004).  Several influential studies have been conducted in response to this 
Page 23 of 46
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/pspb
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
Sources of Felt Ambivalence   24 
paradox.  These studies either identified specific conditions under which valence inconsistencies 
between attitude objects' attributes are particularly predictive of felt ambivalence (Newby-Clark et 
al., 2002), or these studies identified alternative types of valence inconsistencies (i.e., between 
personal evaluations and evaluations by close others) that predict felt ambivalence (Priester & 
Petty, 2001).  These attempts were successful in narrowing the gap between evaluative 
incongruence and felt ambivalence, but they also revealed the need to identify additional causes of 
felt ambivalence. 
 The present research responded to this need.  We built on the observation that all prior 
research sought the causes of felt ambivalence in valence inconsistencies, and we hypothesized 
that other types of inconsistencies may also cause felt ambivalence.  We drew on classic person 
perception evidence for two major typ s of inconsistencies: evaluative incongruence and semantic 
incongruence (Peabody, 1970).  Our main hypothesis was that semantic incongruence may cause 
felt ambivalence independently of the well-established—but modest—effect of evaluative 
incongruence on felt ambivalence.  In addition, we had two ancillary hypotheses.  First, we 
distinguished between self-based incongruence (reflecting consciously held, self-reported 
incongruence) and norm-based incongruence (reflecting norm-list derived, culture-based 
incongruence), and we hypothesized that norm-based evaluative incongruence, self-based 
evaluative incongruence, norm-based semantic incongruence, and self-based semantic 
incongruence all explain unique portions of variance in felt ambivalence.  Second, we 
hypothesized that dissonant feelings play a unique processing role in the effect of evaluative 
incongruence on felt ambivalence, but that dissonant feelings are not involved in the effect of 
semantic incongruence on felt ambivalence. 
 Four experiments fully supported our hypotheses.  Each experiment consistently revealed 
that semantic incongruence helps to close the gap between incongruence and felt ambivalence (see 
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Table 2).  Additionally, Experiments 2, 3a, and 3b consistently revealed that self-based and norm-
based semantic incongruence are independently useful towards closing this gap (see Table 3 and 
4).  But how useful is the collective of norm-based evaluative incongruence, self-based evaluative 
incongruence, norm-based semantic incongruence, and self-based semantic incongruence in 
explaining felt ambivalence?  To address this question, we aggregated the data from our three 
relevant experiments (Experiments 2, 3a, and 3b).  In close replication of Riketta's (2004) meta-
analytic results, norm-based evaluative incongruence alone only explained 17% of the variance in 
felt ambivalence.  In contrast, norm-based evaluative incongruence and norm-based semantic 
incongruence together explained 28% of the variance in felt ambivalence.  Finally, the collection 
of all four types of incongruence (norm-based evaluative incongruence, self-based evaluative 
incongruence, norm-based semantic incongruence, and self-based semantic incongruence) 
explained 37% of the variance in felt ambivalence.  This corresponds to an omnibus effect of r ≈ 
.60. 
 Considering the different measurement methods underlying the different incongruence 
scores and felt ambivalence scores, an omnibus effect of r ≈ .60 is large.  Further, past research has 
identified conditions under which this omnibus effect should be even stronger.  This should arise 
when the cognitive accessibility of incongruent attributes is high (Newby-Clark et al., 2002), 
individuals score highly on relevant personality factors (e.g., self-monitoring—Cowley & Czellar, 
2012), and causes of felt ambivalence other than intrapersonal incongruence (i.e., interpersonal 
incongruence) are included as predictors (Priester & Petty, 2001).  Considering these additional 
sources of variance, the omnibus effect size in the present experiments can even be described as 
very large.  Hence, the introduction of semantic incongruence (and to a lesser degree the 
distinction between norm-based and self-based incongruence) considerably narrows the gap 
between incongruence and felt ambivalence. 
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 The present research raises several interesting questions for future research.  First, how 
much variance may the tandem of evaluative and semantic incongruence explain in felt 
ambivalence under conditions that favor incongruence effects on felt ambivalence--that is, under 
conditions of high cognitive accessibility of incongruent attributes (Newby-Clark et al., 2002), 
among individuals high in preference for consistency (Newby-Clark et al., 2002), and among 
individuals high in self-monitoring (Cowley & Czellar, 2012)?  May the tandem of evaluative and 
semantic incongruence be able to fully close the gap between incongruence and felt ambivalence 
under these conditions? 
 Second, is the effect of semantic incongruence on felt ambivalence direct or mediated by 
another psychological variable?  Experiments 3a and 3b have revealed that aversive dissonant 
feelings constituted a processing variable for the effect of evaluative incongruence on felt 
ambivalence, while aversive dissonant feelings did not constitute a processing variable for the 
effect on semantic incongruence on felt ambivalence.  Analogously, there may be processing 
variables that uniquely drive the effect of semantic incongruence on felt ambivalence.  One 
candidate variable is feelings of uncertainty, which predict feelings of ambivalence (Petrocelli, 
Tormala, & Petty, 2007) .  However, prior research has suggested links between uncertainty and 
aversive feelings (Jonas et al., 1997; van Harreveld, Rutjens, Rotteveel, Nordgren, van der Pligt, 
2009), and our results showed that aversive dissonant feelings played no role in the effect of 
semantic incongruence on felt ambivalence.  Another candidate variable is disfluency—the 
difficulty with which the attributes of an attitude object can be integrated into a coherent whole 
(Schwarz, in press; see also Brinol, Petty, & Tormala, 2006).  Indeed, prior research has found that 
semantic incongruence can slow processing time (Pakizeh et al., 2007), suggesting that semantic 
incongruence causes disfluency. 
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 Third, the present research was largely built on Priester and Petty's (1996) study design 
(e.g., using persons as attitude objects).  Yet, there is also one noteworthy difference between 
Priester and Petty's and our design.  Specifically, the former design varied the relative number of 
positive vs. negative attributes of the target-persons.  In contrast, our design described each target 
person via two attributes, which varied in their degree or extremity of evaluative (and semantic) 
incongruence.  This deviation from Priester and Petty's design appeared necessary because it is not 
clear a priori how to calculate a suitable semantic incongruence index on the basis of more than 
two attributes.  Of course, this is not to say that such an index cannot be derived, and future 
research could attend to this issue.  Reminiscent of Priester and Petty's (1996) work, such research 
would probably have to compare the predictive validity of different semantic congruence formulae 
against each other.  The results of the present research may serve as a benchmark for such a 
comparative approach. 
Fourth, by adapting Priester and Petty's (1996) classic incongruence design, we examined 
the effect of incongruence on felt ambivalence within the context of person perception.  Although 
there is no reason to believe that incongruence effects are restricted to felt ambivalence in person 
perception (see Priester & Petty, 1996), future research could empirically ascertain the explanatory 
power of semantic incongruence for felt ambivalence utilizing other attitude objects.  For example, 
Riketta and Ziegler (2007) have pointed towards the need to understand cause of self-ambivalence.  
Given that the interpersonal circumplex also organizes self-perception (i.e., personality traits; 
Paulhus & John, 1998) semantic incongruence between self-ambivalent individuals' personality 
traits (see Gebauer, Sedikides, Verplanken, & Maio, 2012) may be one such cause.  Along similar 
lines, the interpersonal circumplex also organizes group perception (Fiske et al., 2002).  Thus, 
semantic incongruence may well elicit ambivalent feelings towards groups such as housewives 
(high agency and high communion) or homeless people (low agency and low communion) (Fisk, 
Page 27 of 46
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/pspb
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
Sources of Felt Ambivalence   28 
Cuddy, & Glick, 2007).  Such ambivalent feelings, in turn, may help to explain subtle and blunt 
prejudice against these groups (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995). 
Fifth, are there conditions under which semantic incongruence does not predict felt 
ambivalence?  An East-Asian cultural setting may be one such condition.  Specifically, Peng and 
Nisbett (1999) suggested that the dialectic way of thinking in East-Asian cultures tolerates and 
even encourages semantically contradictory arguments.  As such, semantic incongruence may be 
tolerated and even encouraged, thus reducing its effect on felt ambivalence. 
Finally, future research could also examine potential effects of semantic incongruence on 
non-human attitude objects, such as consumer products.  For example, imagine a car that is not 
only fast and sporty, but also comfortable and spacious.  Although these attributes are positive, we 
may not see them as associated in most vehicles; cars tend to be quick and easy to handle (e.g., 
sports cars) or large and spacious (e.g., SUVs). In a sense, these attributes become semantically 
incongruent for vehicles, despite being evaluatively congruent. We expect that the (vehicle-
specific) semantic incongruence should create feelings of ambivalence in the same way as we have 
observed for persons. 
Conclusion 
 Evaluative incongruence constitutes only a modest cause of felt ambivalence.  The present 
research introduced semantic incongruence as a complementary form of incongruence and as an 
additional cause of felt ambivalence.  Four experiments consistently revealed that semantic 
incongruence elicits felt ambivalence independently of evaluative incongruence.  In fact, our 
results suggested that semantic incongruence is at least as strong a predictor of felt ambivalence as 
is evaluative incongruence.  Additionally, we consistently found that norm-based and self-based 
forms of incongruence independently predict felt ambivalence, and our results pointed towards 
different processes underlying the effects of evaluative incongruence and semantic incongruence 
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on felt ambivalence: only the former elicited dissonant feelings, which mediated the effect of 
evaluative incongruence on felt ambivalence.  Taken together, these findings indicate that 
evaluative incongruence and semantic incongruence jointly determine why people possess those 
familiar and consequential feelings of ambivalence.  Further explorations of this tandem operation 
may help to better understand the antecedents and consequences of felt ambivalence. 
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FOOTNOTES 
 
1     Priester and Petty (1996) used valence norms from Anderson's (1968) norm list.  Thus, in 
addition to our evaluative incongruence index based on Cardiff norms, we calculated an evaluative 
incongruence index based on Anderson norms.  The two indices were strongly correlated, r(20) = 
.71, p = .001.  Nonetheless, when utilizing Anderson norms, evaluative incongruence effects were 
somewhat smaller than when utilizing Cardiff norms.  Correspondingly, when utilizing Anderson 
norms, semantic incongruence effects were comparatively larger than when utilizing Cardiff 
norms.  This is not surprising, because Anderson's (1968) valence norms are based on ratings from 
American colleague students in the 1960's.  Overall then, in order to pit semantic incongruence 
against the most competitive form of evaluative incongruence, we examine our hypotheses utilizing 
the Cardiff valence norms. 
2     The intercomponent ambivalence model is calculated as follows: |trait A| + |trait B| - 2 × |trait 
A + trait B| + 72.  In this model, traits A and B are the valence ratings of each trait within a given 
target person.  Importantly, this model is identical to Thompson et al.'s (1995) frequently used and 
well-validated similarity-intensity model (Priester & Petty, 1996), if one trait is positive and the 
other trait is negative.  However, in contrast to the similarity-intensity model, the intercomponent 
ambivalence model yields meaningful evaluative incongruence scores even when both traits are 
univalent (e.g., trait A is slightly positive and trait B is extremely positive).  Past research has 
established that such univalent evaluative incongruence is an important part of ambivalence (Petty, 
Tormala, Briñol, & Jarvis, 2006).  Irrespective, we additionally calculated an evaluative 
incongruence index based on the discrepancy between the traits of each target person, while 
residualizing the absolute valences of each trait (see Ullrich, Schermelleh-Engel, & Böttcher, 
2008).  The resultant 'residualized discrepancy index' was strongly correlated with our index based 
on the intercomponent ambivalence model, r(20) = .79, p = .001.  When utilizing the residualized 
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discrepancy index, evaluative incongruence effects were somewhat smaller than when utilizing the 
intercomponent ambivalence index.  Correspondingly, when utilizing the residualized discrepancy 
index, semantic incongruence effects were comparatively larger than when utilizing the 
intercomponent ambivalence index.  Thus, in order to pit semantic incongruence against the most 
competitive form of evaluative incongruence, we examined our hypotheses utilizing the 
intercomponent ambivalence model.  Thus, if anything, the decisions explained in this footnote 
and in Footnote 1 bias our results against semantic incongruence effects, rendering the present 
examination a particularly strong test of our hypotheses. 
3     According to these results, dissonant feelings may function similar to self-based evaluative 
incongruence.  Perhaps then, our measures of dissonant feelings and self-based evaluative 
incongruence assess the same construct.  Although inspection of the two measures' face-valid 
items does not suggest so, we additionally examined this question empirically.  Supporting the 
distinctiveness of dissonant feelings and self-based evaluative incongruence, the two measures 
were only moderately related in Experiment 3a, β = .18, SE = .03, t(555) = 5.65, p < .001, and 
Experiment 3b, β = .20, SE = .02, t(1104) = 9.10, p < .001. 
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Figure 1. The interpersonal circumplex (Wiggins et al., 1988) 
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Figure 2. A model depicting the hypothesized strength of predictors of felt ambivalence 
 
  
Note. Straight lines indicate hypothesized effects of a substantial size, with thicker lines indicating larger effect sizes. Dashed lines indicate 
effects that are hypothesized to be non-substantial. 
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Table 1. The 20 target persons, their traits, and the degree of norm-based evaluative and 
norm-based semantic incongruence between these traits. 
target 
person trait 1 trait 2 
norm-based 
evaluative 
incongruence 
norm-based 
semantic 
incongruence 
1 introverted cheerful 70.53 174.40 
2 ruthless self-confident 74.99 75.40 
3 extraverted unwily 71.51 110.00 
4 cocky shy 69.95 129.90 
5 cunning coldhearted 68.49 48.60 
6 cruel uncrafty 70.93 131.20 
7 outgoing enthusiastic 67.16 7.10 
8 antisocial tricky 68.15 77.80 
9 uncunning tenderhearted 69.24 42.10 
10 unaggressive timid 71.69 27.70 
11 softhearted sly 74.69 157.60 
12 tender friendly 67.38 27.10 
13 forceful self-assured 73.82 27.20 
14 sympathetic unauthoritative 69.98 90.30 
15 calculating unargumentative 72.53 151.90 
16 kind ironhearted 73.04 166.70 
17 unsympathetic dissocial 68.40 31.10 
18 distant unsociable 68.56 3.60 
19 domineering boastless 73.06 160.40 
20 forceless dominant 71.27 164.50 
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Table 2.  Norm-based incongruence effects on felt ambivalence. 
Exp. Norm-Based Evaluative 
Incongruence Effect 
Norm-Based Semantic 
Incongruence Effect 
Norm-Based Semantic 
Incongruence Effect (Norm-Based 
Evaluative Incongr. Controlled) 
Norm-Based Evaluative 
Incongruence Effect (Norm-Based 
Semantic Incongr. Controlled) 
β SE t df p β SE t df p β SE t df p β SE t df p 
1 .42 .04 10.02 634 < .001 .50 .05 10.25 634 < .001 .38 .05 7.92 633 < .001 .22 .04 5.75 633 < .001 
2 .43 .04 12.25 646 < .001 .54 .05 10.31 646 < .001 .43 .06 7.79 645 < .001 .20 .03 6.54 645 < .001 
3a .40 .03 12.56 555 < .001 .50 .05 10.21 555 < .001 .40 .05 7.86 554 < .001 .19 .03 7.28 554 < .001 
3b .40 .02 17.43 1104 < .001 .48 .04 13.65 1104 < .001 .37 .04 9.87 1103 < .001 .20 .02 9.73 1103 < .001 
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Table 3. Effect-specificity of norm-based incongruence on self-based incongruence. 
Exp DV: Self-Based Eval. Incongr. DV: Self-Based Eval. Incongr. DV: Self-Based Sem. Incongr. DV: Self-Based Sem. Incongr. 
  
IV: Norm-Based Eval. Incongr. IV: Norm-Based Sem. Incongr. IV: Norm-Based Eval. Incongr. IV: Norm-Based Sem. Incongr. 
  β SE t df p β SE t df p β SE t df p β SE t df p 
1 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
2 .48 .03 14.69 644 < .001 -.007 .05 -.14 644 .89 -.18 .03 -7.22 644 < .001 .65 .04 15.76 644 < .001 
3a .50 .04 11.94 553 <.001 -.04 .05 -.93 553 .35 -.18 .02 -7.89 553 <.001 .63 .04 15.84 553 < .001 
3b .52 .03 16.68 1102 < .001 -.03 .04 -.74 1,102 .46 -.18 .02 -8.96 1102 < .001 .66 .03 22.41 1102 < .001 
Note. DV = dependent variable/criterion, IV = independent variable/predictor, Eval. Incongr. = Evaluative Incongruence, Sem. Incongr. = Semantic 
Incongruence.  The analysis predicting self-based evaluative incongruence (data columns 1 and 2) included self-based semantic incongruence as a 
covariate.  Conversely, the analysis predicting self-based semantic incongruence (data columns 3 and 4) included self-based evaluative 
incongruence as a covariate. 
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Table 4. The role of self-based evaluative incongruence in the effect of norm-based evaluative incongruence on felt ambivalence. 
Exp. Norm-Based Evaluative Incongruence Effect 
(Self-Based Evaluative Incongruence Controlled) 
Sobel Test Self-Based Evaluative Incongruence Effect 
(Norm-Based Evaluative Incongruence Controlled) 
  β SE t df p z SE p β SE t df p 
1 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
2 .12 .03 3.69 643 < .001 4.60 .02 < .001 .19 .04 4.84 643 < .001 
3a .11 .03 3.35 552 < .001 5.15 .02 < .001 .20 .04 5.71 552 < .001 
3b .12 .03 4.81 1101 < .001 6.43 .02 < .001 .19 .03 6.97 1101 < .001 
Note. We controlled for norm-based and self-based semantic incongruence throughout all analyses provided in this table. 
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Table 5. The role of self-based semantic incongruence in the effect of norm-based semantic incongruence on felt ambivalence. 
Exp. Norm-Based Semantic Incongruence Effect 
(Self-Based Semantic Incongruence Controlled) 
Sobel Test Self-Based Semantic Incongruence Effect 
(Norm-Based Semantic Incongruence Controlled) 
  β SE t df p z SE p β SE t df p 
1 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
2 .13 .05 2.59 643 .01 5.55 .04 < .001 .33 .06 5.94 643 < .001 
3a .17 .05 3.10 552 < .001 4.46 .04 < .001 .29 .06 4.65 552 < .001 
3b .10 .04 2.69 1101 .008 6.80 .03 < .001 .32 .04 7.14 1101 < .001 
Note. We controlled for norm-based and self-based evaluative incongruence throughout all analyses provided in this table. 
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